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A
In protecting ourselves against this enemy, it is therefore
quite sensible to take religion into account in developing
measures to preserve our security. 
Consider the following: ⁽1⁾ The government targets its
surveillance programs—including electronic surveillance
and infiltration by undercover agents—at mosques and
other Muslim organizations that are thought to harbor 
radical Muslims; ⁽2⁾ The government prohibits any person
to preach the “glorification of terrorism,” which includes
certain sermons by radical imams; ⁽3⁾ The government
requires all Muslim airline passengers to undergo extensive
security investigations before they are allowed to board com-
mercial airplanes; ⁽4⁾ The government interns all Muslims
in the United States, including Muslim Americans, in
detention centers, where they will remain until they are
individually determined to be loyal to the United States.
We have already instituted ⁽1⁾ and England has already
instituted ⁽2⁾. It is easy to envision ⁽3⁾ following another
round of 9/11-type attacks, particularly if it involves Muslim
Americans, and although ⁽4⁾ may seem extreme, it is impor-
tant to remember than the United States interned 120,000
individuals of Japanese descent, including some 80,000
Japanese Americans, during World War II. Put simply, the
war on terrorism poses not only a serious threat to the United
States, but a unique threat to the freedom of religion.
There are, of course, many constitutional doctrines,
involving both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
of the First Amendment, which would guide the analysis 
of these questions, were they to arise. But constitutional
doctrines are also subject to interpretation and to the exer-
cise of judgment in their application to particular situations.
A fundamental question about the protection of religious freedom in the twenty-
first century concerns, centrally, the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional
system. More particularly, it concerns the responsibility and capacity of the Supreme 
Court to protect the freedom of religion during the war on terrorism.  The war on
terrorism poses a unique problem in American history. It is the first time in our nation’s
history that the enemy of the United States has been defined in religious terms.
Freedom of Religion, 
the War on Terrorism, and
the Courts 
This essay is based on the 2006 John Nuveen Lecture, delivered on 
November 2, 2006, in Swift Lecture Hall. 
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“I am for the people, while the government 
is for the profiteers . . .” 
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Equally—indeed, more—important in times of national
crisis is the general approach the Supreme Court takes to
resolving conflict between national security and individual
liberties. 
How should judges approach the decision of cases
involving the constitutionality of such measures if they are
taken by the executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment to protect the national security? As a matter of first
principles, logic would seem to suggest that in addressing
cases involving threats to the national security judges should
start with a healthy dose of deference to military and 
executive officials. This seems sensible for several reasons. 
First, individual judges have relatively little experience
with national security matters. Such cases arise infrequently,
and judges are relative novices when it comes to assessing
the possible implications of their decisions to the national
security. This cuts in favor of deference. Second, the stakes
in such cases may be quite high. Unlike most legal disputes,
in which an erroneous judicial decision will have only 
modest consequences and is usually correctible after the fact
(if not for the parties, then at least more generally), the
potential consequences to the nation if a judge is wrong 
in a case involving the national security may be truly catas-
trophic. Hence, a certain measure of deference seems wise.
Third, for institutional reasons, judges should be reluctant
to second-guess the judgments of military and executive
officials in such conflicts because if they err in rejecting
those judgments they may harm not only the national secu-
rity but also the long-term credibility of the judiciary itself.
Again, logic demands deference.
Not surprisingly in light of these reflections, judges have
traditionally followed this logical course when addressing
conflicts between individual liberties and national security.
They have presumed that the actions of military and exec-
utive officials were constitutional whenever they acted in
the name of national security. The three most dramatic
twentieth-century clashes between civil liberties and national
security illustrate this approach. 
When the United States entered the First World War 
in April 1917, there was strong opposition to both the war
and the draft. President Woodrow Wilson had little patience
for such dissent. Only weeks after the United States entered
the war, Congress enacted the Espionage Act of 1917. A 
year later, it enacted the Sedition Act of 1918. These laws
effectively made it a crime for any person to criticize 
the government, the president, the draft, the war, the 
Constitution, or the military of the United States. The
Department of Justice prosecuted more than 2,000 indi-
viduals for allegedly disloyal speech, and in an atmosphere
of fear, hysteria, and clamor, most judges were quick to mete
out severe punishment to those deemed disloyal. The result
was the suppression of virtually all criticism of that war. 
For example, Rose Pastor Stokes, the editor of the social-
ist Jewish Daily News, was sentenced to ten years in prison
for saying, “I am for the people, while the government 
is for the profiteers,” during an antiwar statement to the
Women’s Dining Club of Kansas City. D. T. Blodgett was
sentenced to twenty years in prison for circulating a leaflet
urging voters in Iowa not to reelect a congressman who had
voted for conscription. The Reverend Clarence H. Waldron
was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for distributing a
pamphlet stating that “if Christians [are] forbidden to fight
to preserve the Person of their Lord and Master, they may
not fight to preserve themselves, or any city they should
happen to dwell in.” 
In a series of decisions in 1919 and 1920, the Supreme
Court consistently upheld the convictions of individuals
who had agitated against the war and the draft. Embracing
the “logical” presumption for balancing civil liberties and
national security concerns in time of war, the Court explained
its reasoning: “When a nation is at war many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as
men fight and no Court could regard them as protected by
any constitutional right.”1
In the years after World War I, Americans came increas-
ingly to recognize that these prosecutions had been 
excessive. Officials who had served in the Wilson adminis-
tration conceded that the general atmosphere of intolerance
had led to serious constitutional violations and criticized
some federal judges for having lost their heads. Over the
next few years, the federal government acknowledged that
injustices had been done in the name of national security
and every person who had been convicted of seditious
. . . it had failed in its responsibility to protect 
constitutional rights in wartime.
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expression during World War I was released from prison
and granted amnesty. In later years, the Supreme Court
implicitly overruled its World War I era decisions, effec-
tively acknowledging that it had failed in its responsibility
to protect constitutional rights in wartime.
The critical civil liberties issue in World War II arose out
of the Japanese American internment. On February 19, 
1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive
Order 9066, which authorized the Army to “designate mil-
itary areas” from which certain “persons may be excluded.” 
Over the next eight months, almost 120,000 individuals of
Japanese descent were forced to leave their homes in Cali-
fornia, Washington, Oregon, and Arizona. Two-thirds of
these men, women, and children were American citizens,
representing almost ninety percent of all Japanese Ameri-
cans. No charges were brought against these individuals;
there were no hearings; and they did not know where they
were going, how long they would be detained, what condi-
tions they would face, or what fate would await them. Many
families lost everything. The internees were transported to
one of ten permanent internment camps and placed in 
overcrowded rooms with no furniture other than cots. Sur-
rounded by barbed wire and military police, they remained
in these detention camps for some three years. 
Why did this happen? Certainly, the days following Pearl
Harbor were dark days for the American spirit. Fear of 
possible Japanese sabotage and espionage was rampant, and
an outraged public felt an understandable instinct to lash
out at those who had attacked it. But this act was also very
much an extension of more than a century of racial prejudice
against the “yellow peril.” Racist statements and sentiments
permeated the debate from December 1941 to February 1942
about how to deal with individuals of Japanese descent.
Although the Department of Justice maintained that 
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A soldier escorts several Japanese American children and a pastor in
the back of a truck during their evacuation from Bainbridge Island,
Washington to a relocation center. Photo dated 1942.
. . . the long shadow of the House Committee on Un-American Activities 
fell across our campuses and our culture.
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a mass evacuation of Japanese Americans was both unnec-
essary and unconstitutional, and although FBI director J.
Edgar Hoover reported to Attorney General Biddle that the
demand for mass evacuation was based on “public hysteria”
rather than on fact, FDR nonetheless signed the Executive
Order, largely for political reasons. Roosevelt did not 
want to alienate voters on the West Coast, and 1942 was an 
election year. 
In Korematsu v. United States,2 decided in 1944, the
Supreme Court embraced the “logical” presumption for
dealing with conflicts between civil liberties and the
national security. In a six-to-three decision, the Court, in
an opinion by Justice Black, upheld the President’s action:
[W]e are not unmindful of the hardships imposed . . . 
upon a large group of American citizens. But hard-
ships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of
hardships. . . . To cast this case into outlines of racial
prejudice . . . confuses the issue. Korematsu was not
excluded from the [West Coast] because of hostility 
to . . . his race, [but] because . . . the . . . military
authorities . . . decided that the urgency of the situa-
tion demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry
be segregated from the [area]. . . . We cannot—by
availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hind-
sight—now say that at that time these actions were
unjustified.3
In the years after World War II, attitudes about the
Japanese internment began to shift. On February 19, 
1976, as part of the celebration of the Bicentennial of the
Constitution, President Gerald Ford issued Presidential
Proclamation 4417, in which he acknowledged that, in the
spirit of celebrating our Constitution, we must recognize
“our national mistakes as well as our national achieve-
ments.” “February 19th,” he noted, “is the anniversary of a
sad day in American history,” for it was “on that date in
1942 . . . that Executive Order 9066 was issued.” President
Ford observed that “we now know what we should have
known then”—that the evacuation and internment of loyal
Japanese American citizens was “wrong.”4
Several years later, President Ronald Reagan signed the
Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 1988, which officially
declared that the Japanese internment was a “grave in-
justice” and offered an official Presidential apology and
reparations to each of the Japanese-American internees who
had suffered discrimination, loss of liberty, loss of property,
and personal humiliation because of the actions of the
United States government. Over the years, Korematsu has
become a constitutional pariah. The Supreme Court has
never cited it with approval of its result.
As World War II drew to a close, the nation moved
almost seamlessly into the Cold War. During this era, the
nation demonized members of the Communist Party and
the long shadow of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities fell across our campuses and our culture. Red-
hunters demanded, and got, the blacklisting of thousands of
individuals and a fear of ideological contamination swept
the nation. 
The key constitutional decision in this era was Dennis v.
United States,5 which involved the prosecution under the
Smith Act of the leaders of the American Communist Party.
The indictment charged the defendants with conspiring to
advocate the violent overthrow of the government. In a six-
to-two decision, the Court held that their convictions did
not violate the First Amendment. The Court concluded
that because the violent overthrow of government is such a
grave harm, the danger need be neither clear nor present to
justify suppression. 
Over the next several years, in a series of decisions
premised on Dennis, the Court upheld far-reaching legislative
investigations of “subversive” organizations and individuals
and affirmed the exclusion of members of the Communist
Party from the bar, the ballot, and public employment. In
so doing, the Court put its stamp of approval on an array of
actions we today look back on as models of McCarthyism.
As the historian David Caute has concluded, in the early
fifties, “the Constitution was concussed in the courts,” and
this was especially so in the Supreme Court, which too often
served as “a compliant instrument of administrative perse-
cution and Congressional inquisition.”6
As these episodes illustrate, the dominant approach of
the Supreme Court in the first half of the twentieth century
to resolving conflicts between civil liberties and the national
security was to employ the “logical” presumption. For all
. . . the essential predicate for a policy of judicial deference in
these circumstances is — predictably — lacking. 
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the reasons I identified earlier, the Court embraced a highly
deferential stance, presuming that restrictions of civil liberties
in wartime were constitutionally justified so long as the gov-
ernment could offer a reasonable explanation for its actions.
But, as we have seen, this approach proved disastrous. These
decisions have all come to be regarded as black marks on
the Court’s reputation. 
The problem, quite simply, is that although a presump-
tion of deference to executive and military officials in
wartime may be logical in theory, it fails in practice. With
the benefit of hindsight, the reasons for this failure are 
evident. A policy of deference assumes that those making
the critical judgments are properly taking the relevant 
factors into account in a fair and reasonable manner. If 
they fail to do so, the underlying rationale for deference is
destroyed. As it turns out, the essential predicate for a 
policy of judicial deference in these circumstances is—
predictably—lacking. Government officials charged with
responsibility for the nation’s security tend naturally to exag-
gerate the dangers facing the nation both to protect them-
selves in the event they fail and to persuade legislators and
the public to grant them as much power as possible. More-
over, government officials charged with responsibility for
the nation’s security tend not to be particularly sensitive 
to the importance of civil liberties and are therefore too
quick to sacrifice those liberties in order to achieve their 
primary goal of safeguarding the national security. Finally,
opportunistic politicians tend to exploit periods of real or
perceived crisis for partisan and personal gain. A time-
honored method of gaining and/or consolidating power is
to incite public fear, demonize an internal “enemy,” and
then “protect” the public by prosecuting, interning, deport-
ing, and spying upon those accused of “disloyalty.” 
These three considerations are not exhaustive, but they
are adequate to explain why the “logical” presumption of
judicial deference to executive and military officials
inevitably leads to unfortunate decisions. It is pointless,
indeed dangerous, to defer to those whose judgments are
likely to be distorted by such influences. As a practical matter,
military and executive officials will invariably overvalue
national security concerns at the expense of civil liberties.
There may be sound reasons for judges to be cautious when
they second-guess military and executive officials, but prag-
matism—informed by experience—demands that courts
be more rigorous in their exercise of judicial review if we
are to avoid more such decisions in the future.
Of course, the comparative advantage of courts over the
executive and legislative branches in interpreting and
enforcing individual liberties is familiar. Responsiveness to
the electorate may be essential to the day-to-day workings
of democracy, but that responsiveness can lead the govern-
ment too readily to sacrifice the rights of those who are
regarded as different, dangerous, or disloyal. Judges with life
tenure and a more focused attention on the preservation of
civil liberties are more likely to protect our freedoms than
the elected branches of government. 
Because we know from experience that there is a repeated
pattern of excessive restriction of civil liberties in wartime,
courts in the twenty-first century must abandon the “logi-
cal” presumption of deference to executive and military
authority and employ a more rigorous standard of review. In
light of experience, we know that the “logical” presumption
is counterproductive. The lesson of history is that courts
must closely scrutinize invocations of military necessity and
national security as justification for limiting civil liberties.
In fact, the Court, I believe, has already learned the
lessons of history and has increasingly rejected the “logical”
presumption. The Justices are acutely aware of the Court’s
past failures, and no Justice wants his or her legacy to be
similarly tainted. 
Over the past half-century, at least five Supreme Court
cases have posed significant “civil liberties versus national
security” conflicts somewhat analogous to those during
World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. The first
two arose out of the Vietnam War, the latter three involved
the war on terrorism. In each of these cases, the Court
eschewed the sort of judicial deference that so ill-served the
nation in the earlier era.
The two Vietnam War cases implicated the First and
Fourth Amendments, respectively. New York Times Co. 
v. United States involved one of the most dramatic con-
frontations in American constitutional history. The U.S.
government attempted to enjoin publication by the New
York Times and the Washington Post of the Pentagon Papers,
. . . the twenty-first century has gotten off 
to a rather good start.
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a “top secret” study of the Vietnam War, prepared within
the recesses of the Defense Department, that had been
made available to the newspapers through an unprece-
dented breach of security. The government maintained that
continued publication of the Pentagon Papers would
grievously harm the national security. In a six-to-three deci-
sion, the Court declined to defer to the executive’s national
security claim and ruled that the government could not
constitutionally enjoin the publication. Justice Stewart
insisted that the government could not constitutionally
enjoin the publication because it had failed to prove that
disclosure “will surely result in direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to our Nation.”7
Several years later, President Richard Nixon maintained
that the executive is constitutionally exempt from the 
ordinary requirements of the Fourth Amendment when 
it undertakes national security investigations. In United
States v. United States District Court (Keith),8 the Supreme
Court unanimously rejected this contention, holding that
even in national security investigations the President has no
constitutional authority to wiretap American citizens on
American soil without a judicially issued search warrant
based upon probable cause. 
More recently, the Supreme Court has addressed and
sternly rejected Bush administration claims of executive
authority in the war on terrorism. In each of these three
decisions, the Court refused to grant deference to the exec-
utive. In Rasul v. Bush,9 the Court held that federal courts
have habeas corpus jurisdiction to review the legality of the
confinement of the Guantanamo Bay detainees. In Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld,10 the Court held that the government could not
indefinitely detain an American citizen captured in
Afghanistan without giving him a hearing meeting the
requirements of due process. And in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,11
the Court held that the procedures adopted by President
Bush for military commissions violated the basic tenets of
military and international law.
Capturing the spirit of these decisions, Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor explained in Hamdi that it “is during our
most challenging and uncertain moments” that our Nation’s
commitment to the Constitution “is most severely tested,”
and “it is in those times that we must preserve our com-
mitment at home to the principles for which we fight
abroad.” In rejecting the government’s contention that the
Court should play “a heavily circumscribed role” in reviewing
the actions of the executive in wartime, O’Connor pointedly
observed that “a state of war is not a blank check for the Pres-
ident when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”12
In terms of judicial review of conflicts between civil 
liberties and national security, the twenty-first century has
gotten off to a rather good start. Having learned from the
mistakes of the past, the Court (or at least a majority of the
Justices) has jettisoned the “logical” presumption evidenced
in the earlier era and replaced it with the more “pragmatic”
presumption of close judicial scrutiny evidenced in Rasul,
Hamdi, and Hamdan. This is a fundamental step forward in
American constitutional history. Whether it will carry 
forward to possible restrictions of the freedom of religion
as the war on terrorism unfolds remains to be seen. 
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